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Abstract
In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst two
generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new
expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump-
sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic
labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget,
some generations obtain a benet, whilst some other must pay the entire
cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which
are more single-minded on leisure are the most better o¤ since they are
more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further-
more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the
same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds
only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for
politicians is considered.
We work in order to have leisure (Aristotle)
1 Introduction
The participation to the labour force of the older persons in the U.S. labour
market has been steadily declining over the last century. If the labour force
participation of men aged 65-69 was around 60% in the 50s, the same gure
had fallen to 26% in the 90s [17]. In many OECD countries, workers withdraw
from the labour market well before the o¢ cial retirement age. Eventually this
long-term decline, associated with an increase in life expectancy, has led to a
considerable increase in retirement years. Otherwise, the Government expendi-
ture for social security has been skyrocketing and so has been the percentage of
workers covered by the system. This situation runs into risk to become nan-
cially unsustainable over the next years, unless governments undertake struc-
tural reforms as suggested by many economists (see Feldstein & Liebman [20]
amongst the others).
1
Over the last few years, the economic literature has been trying to give plau-
sible explanations to this strong change in the old workerslifestyle. According
to an OECD survey [42] nancial incentives embedded into public pensions and
other assistance schemes pull old workers into retirement. Nevertheless, the
OECD makes a distinction between pull factors of retirement and push factors
of retirement. The former include all of those nancial benets that incentive
workers to anticipate their retirement, whilst the latter refer to negative percep-
tions by old workers about their ability or productivity and to socio-demographic
characteristics.
In this paper I will take the distance from the OECDs view, which considers
nancial benets as a pull factor which reduces the amount of work. I suggest
that preferences of workers for leisure shape the characteristics of modern social
security systems. Thus, generosity of governmentstransfers is not exogenously
given but it is rather the e¤ect of a precise political mechanism; this is driven by
old workers who use their political power to obtain what they need to nance
their retirement years.
To explain the early retirement phenomenon, I will use an overlapping gen-
eration model (OLG) model which considers a society divided into two groups
of workers: the old and the young. I will assume that there is a political com-
petition between two candidates who must choose e¤ective marginal tax rates
on labour in order to maximize the probability of winning elections.
The core assumption of the model is based on the idea of single-mindedness,
introduced by Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin [40]. They assumed that the old prefer
leisure more than the young; this structure of preferences would explain why
the old require (and eventually obtain) more generous transfers from the gov-
ernment and why social security expenditures have been increased so much over
the last decades. They adopted an OLG model where society is divided into old
and young workers and showed that
retired elderly can concentrate on issue that relate only to their age
such as the pension or the health system
while the young have to choose amongst
age-related and occupation issues
Eventually, they concluded,
the elderly are politically powerful because they are more single-
minded and (. . . ) more single-minded groups tend to vote for larger
social security programs that benet them
According to this theory the group of old workers, because more single-
minded, would have a greater power of inuence over politicians and they are
more able to drive the optimal taxation (a sort of tyranny of the elder or Geron-
tocracy, to quote authors).
Indeed, neither Demographics nor the need for an assistance would explain
the skyrocketing increase in the governments expenditure for social security
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systems and the broad reduction in retirement age over the last decades, but
preferences of the old for leisure would provide a more suitable explanation to
this upward trend. In a recent work, Diamond [17], attempting to describe the
linkage between the social security system and the retirement in the U.S., wrote
in his conclusions:
there is clear evidence from both previous work (. . . ) that the broad
structure of the SS program inuences retirement timing. Evidence
on the e¤ects of variation in the benets provided by this program
is less clear, however.
In particular, I will assume that the Government has to decide how to
divide the revenues generated by the taxation of the two groups. In doing
this, it exploits a balanced budget constraint which is based on (distortionary)
labour income taxation. Eventually, I will demonstrate that the older gener-
ations obtain a higher tax credit (or a reduction of the e¤ective marginal tax
rate) than the younger generations and that they get a higher level of leisure.
A situation which is consistent with the olds needs, since their preferences are
more oriented toward retirement than toward work. The work also explains
the importance of single-mindedness of social groups and the role of preferences
of individuals in political competition. The more single-minded a group, the
higher is its political power, captured by a density function which is assumed
to be monotonically increasing in the level of leisure. Since more single-minded
groups are, other things being equal, more politically powerful, they are more
able to obtain favourable policies by political candidates in equilibrium.
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2 The basic model
I consider an OLG model, where each generation lives for two periods: the
youth and old age. At any period of time, the generation of youths coexists
with the generation of the elderly. At the beginning of the next period, the
elderly die, the youths become old and a new generation of youths is born. As a
consequence, there are two overlapping generations of people living at any one
time. Generations are unlinked, meaning that for whatever reason, a generation
does not leave any bequest to another generation. Individuals consume all the
available income earned at a given period of time; thus, it is not possible neither
to save nor to borrow money.
Then, at time t = 0; :::;+1, let a continuum of voters of size one be par-
titioned into two generations of workers I = t  1; t. The old represent the
generation born at time t  1 and it is denoted by t  1 whilst the young repre-
sent the generation born at time t and it is denoted by t. The two generations
have same size, which does not change over time1 . A single worker is denoted
by i 2 0; 12.
Each worker has to decide how to divide his total endowment of time T
between work, Lit > 0 and leisure, l
i
t > 0. If leisure is almost equal to the total
endowment of time, I assume that the worker retires and gets a benet (i.e. a
pension).
The component of every voters welfare depends on scal policies chosen by
two political candidates j = A;B which a¤ect his consumption and which is
known by both parties, whilst the other component of welfare, which derives
from personal attributes of candidates, is only imperfectly observed by parties.
Both candidates have an ideological label (i.e. they are seen as Democrats or
Republicans), exogenously given. In other words, I assume that individuals
preferences for consumption are perfectly visible, whilst other political aspects
such as ideology are not (Linbeck & Weibulls stochastic heterogeneity). The
deterministic component of a workers welfare is captured by a quasi-linear
utility function in consumption and leisure, whilst the stochastic component
is caputured by the expression DA  (i;I + ), where DA = 1 if candidate A
wins elections and DA = 0 if candidate B wins elections. The term  Q 0
reects candidate As general popularity amongst the electorate and it is only
realized between the announcement of partiespolicy vector and elections. It is
not idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed on the interval (  12h ; 12h ) with
mean zero and density h, known by the two candidates and normalized to one
for simplicity. Otherwise, the term i;IQ 0 represents an individual component
of preferences for candidate A. It is known by political candidates and uniformly
distributed on (  1
2sI
; 1
2sI
), again with mean zero and density sI .
A representative old worker at time t has the following utility function:
U i;t 1t = c
t 1
t +  
t 1 log lt 1t +D
A  (i;t 1 + ) (1)
1Note that this is a di¤erent with respect to Profeta who assumes that the two groups have
di¤erent sizes.
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where ct 1t is consumption and  
t 1 2 [0; 1] is a parameter representing the
intrinsic preference of the old worker for leisure.
The old worker consumes all his income:
ct 1t = w
t 1(1   0t 1t )(T   lt 1t ) (2)
where wt 1 is the unitary wage per hour worked, 
0t 1
t := 
 
1  at 1t

the ef-
fective tax rate on labour income equal to the nominal tax rate  2 min; max
net of the tax credit at 1t 2

at 1mint ; a
t 1max
t

, with at 1mint < 1 and a
t 1max
t >
1. I assume that  is equal for every generation and steady over time. min and
max denotes the minimum and maximum legal tax rates, whilst amin and amax
the minimum and maximum tax credits, both written in the budget law.
Similarly, preferences of a representative young worker t are given by the
following utility function:
U i;tt = c
t
t +  
t log ltt + (c
t
t+1 +  
t 1 log ltt+1) +D
A  (i;t + ) (3)
subject to
ctt = w
t(1   0tt )(T   ltt) (4)
ctt+1 = w
t(1   0tt+1)(T   ltt+1) (5)
where  is a discount factor and att 2

atmint ; a
tmax
t

the tax credit, with
at 1mint < 1 and a
t 1max
t > 1.
Condition aImint < 1; a
Imax
t > 1 makes a redistribution program feasible
since, as we see later in studying the budget constraint of the government, it
allows a generation to obtain positive transfers paid by the other generations.
2.1 Di¤erent preferences for leisure
I assume that the old and the young are identical in every respect except one
Axiom 1 the intrinsic value of the old workers for leisure is assumed to be
greater than the young workers; that is,  t 1 >  t.
This axiom is supported by the empirical evidence. In fact, the economic
science has produced many works which provide possible explanations to the
existence of a di¤erence in preferences. Moreover, over the last years, other
social sciences like Sociology and Psychology have added some very useful con-
tributions. I distinguish the economic reasons from the non-economic reasons.
The economic reasons are summarized in the work by Mulligan & Sala-i-
Martin (1999).
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Di¤erences in labour Productivity. Since the labour productivity is declining
in age, the old are less productive than the young and, as a consequence, they
earn a lower wage. This theory would explain the willingness by the old to
retire: less productive workers in the labour market nd protable to devote
relatively more of their time and e¤ort to the political sector as to gain monetary
transfers that they would not get if they relied on labour market. Nevertheless,
for the theory to hold it is important to assume that leisure time devoted to
political activities is a normal good. That is, an increase in the total leisure
time provokes an increase in leisure time devoted to political activities, due to
the income e¤ect. Of course these assumptions are not entirely accepted in the
literature. In particular, evidence about the e¤ects of age on productivity and
wages does not lead to clear-cut conclusions. For example, a work by Skierbekk
([47]) found that individual job performance decreases from around 50 years of
age and that productivity reductions at older ages are particularly strong for
work tasks where problem solving, learning and speed are needed, while in jobs
where experience and verbal abilities are important, older individualsmaintain
a relatively high productivity level.
Di¤erences in Human Capital Accumulation. The young are more engaged
in self-nanced human capital accumulation while they work than the old. As a
consequence, the value of time for the young may be higher than their average
hourly wage (see Sta¤ord and Duncan [48]).
Long-term employment contracts. The empirical evidence shows that due to
the Lazear-type contracts, labour productivity for workers aged 60+ is signi-
cantly lower than wages.
As for the non-economic reasons, I refer to a work by Hershey, Henkens and
Van Dalen [25]. In comparing the Dutch with the U.S. Social Security System,
the authors discovered that the Americans had signicantly longer future time
perspectives, higher level of retirement goal clarity and they tended to be more
engaged in retirement planning activities. Thus, these ndings are able to ex-
plain the existence of socio-cultural di¤erences in the preferences for retirement.
They go on a¢ rming that American workers think, prepare and save more for
retirement... beginning in early adulthood, focalizing on the di¤erence among
societies, where there exists a major di¤erence in nancial responsibility, di¤er-
ent level of uncertainty for future pension payouts and di¤erent psychological
pressures. Finally, in concluding that the success of political initiatives depends
in part on changing the dimensions of the psyche that motivate individuals
to adaptively prepare for old age, they implicitly recognize that preferences of
individuals for leisure may endogenously change over time, again due to cultural
and psychological issues.
2.2 Denition of Single-Mindedness
I introduce now two important denitions:
Denition 2 a generation A is said to be more single-minded than a generation
B with respect to leisure if its preferences for leisure are higher than preferences
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of B. That is if  A >  B.
Denition 3 a generation A is said to be more politically powerful than a gen-
eration B if its density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
The political power of a generation is represented by its ability of inuencing
candidateschoices, when they have to take decisions about the optimal policy
vector. In traditional probabilistic voting models this power is expressed by the
density function which captures the distribution of the electorate.
Axiom 4 the density function of a generation is monotonically increasing in
the level of leisure. That is sI = s(l), with @s@l > 0.
Note, that this axiom brings something new with respect to previous prob-
abilistic voting models, where the density function is only a constant and does
not depend on anything.
In the resolution of the game it will be demonstrated that lI = l ( ) and
@l
@ > 0; that is, leisure in monotonically increasing in preferences for leisure.
This result, jointly read with axiom 2, allows us to show that, other things being
equal, an increase in the single-mindedness of a generation entails an increase
in its political power. To demonstate this, it is su¢ cient applying the chain rule
to obtain ds
I
d I
=
>0z}|{
@sI
@lI

>0z}|{
@lI
@ I
> 0.
This result says that the linkage between preferences of a generation and
its political power passes through an increase in the level of leisure which the
density depends upon. In other words, it must be the case where over leisure,
di¤erent generations have di¤erent preferences for political parties. A greater
level of single-mindedness entails higher values of the density function which
tends to give to the distribution a ticker shape. Figure 1 shows an example of
di¤erent distributions amongst cohorts.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The gure shows how distributions of the two generations depend on leisure and
that the old generation (red) has a ticker distribution than the young generation
(orange). The distribution is assumed to be uniform. The broadness of the
interval (  1
2sI
; 1
2sI
) is not xed, because s is a monotonically increasing function
of leisure, and higher levels of leisure increase s reducing the broadness of the
interval. As a result, we obtain an higher concentration of swing voters around
.
Figure 2 shows the e¤ects of an increase in  within a generation. A change
in  (from  to  0, with  0 >  ) entails an increase both in l and s. Since
s stands at the denominator of the expression representing the endpoints of
the interval, the broadness of the interval reduces and the distribution becomes
thicker.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
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2.3 The Government
I consider two self-interested candidates which choose an element qjt =
n

0t 1
t ; 
0t
t
o
,
encompassing the two e¤ective tax rates 
0t 1
t and 
0t
t , from the (common) strat-
egy set Q  R2.
Furthermore, I introduce the budget constraints of the Government:
j  1
2

0t 1
t (T   lt 1t )wt 1t +
1
2

0t
t (T   ltt)wtt = 0 (6)
where 12
0t 1
t (T   lt 1t )wt 1t represents total revenues generated by the tax-
ation of the old and 12
0t
t (T   ltt)wtt total revenues generated by the taxation of
the young.2
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour, taxation entails
ine¢ ciencies, since it distorts workersdecisions on the amount of labour sup-
plied.
As suggested by Lindbeck and Weibull, I assume the existence of a balanced-
budget redistribution where the government cannot redistribute more resources
than those available in the economy, and cannot use tax revenues for any other
purpose than redistribution so that the conditionj = 0 says that revenues ob-
tained via labour taxation are only used to redistribute wealth amongst cohorts.
To avoid the case in which a di¤erence in wage levels is the solely responsible for
the existence of retirement I impose that wages are equal for every generation:
wt 1t = w
t
t = w. Furthermore, without loss of generality, I normalize the wage
rate to the unity.
The advantage of adopting a budget constraint with distortionary taxation
like that I use is realism. Economists like Profeta [43] and Mulligan & Sala-
i-Martin [37] formalized models in an attempt to explain the linkage between
intergenerational redistribution and early retirement; nevertheless, they seem
to be a¤ected by a fundamental problem due to the use of lump sum transfers;
in Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin an interest group may tax its members with a
labour income tax and distribute the proceeds to them in a lump sum fashion;
Profeta used a lump-sum mechanism to transfer wealth both within the cohort
and amongst di¤erent cohorts. Finally, also Linbeck and Weibull [35] study a
redistributive model with political competition where gross incomes are xed
and known and, hence, rst-best (individual) lump-sum redistributions are in
principle feasible. A redistributive system such as that all of these models
assume, with the presence of lump-sum taxation, does not exist in the real
world. All the most recent studies on characteristics of social security systems
around the world show that the inocome taxation is the only source which
nances social expenditures. For instance, Diamond found out that The Social
2Note that j is a strictly concave function in aIt . The rst order condition gives
@j
@aIt
=
  (T+(a
I
t 1))
2  I2
2(1+(aIt 1))2
and the second order condition gives @
2j
@aI2t
=   2 I2
2(1+(aIt 1))3
< 0.
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Security system in the U.S. today is nanced by a payroll tax which is levied
on workers and rms equally, whilst Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, adopting a
cross-section analysis of 89 countries, recognized that the 96% of social security
programs are nanced with payroll taxes.
2.4 The political competition
2.4.1 The Lindbeck & Weibull framework
As said before voterswelfare depends both on a deterministic and on a sto-
chastic component. The presence of uncertainty, captured by variables related
to preferences for political candidates, assures the existence of a NE in a multi-
dimensional space (see Lindbeck & Weibull and Dixit & Londregan [18]). In
the abscence of that candidates would be perfectly able to observe how voters
cast their ballots and then each voter would abruptly switch suppor toward
the candidate which promises him the most favourable policy. In such a case
the non-existence of an equilibrium is due to the fact that any chosen policy
would be beaten by another policy. Therefore, traditional Downsian electoral
competition models lead to a negative result where no Condorcet winner exists.
Probabilistic voting models, instead, smooth out this discontinuity because a
small change in the policy chosen by a candidate entails only a small change in
the probability of support from voters and not a total loss of support. Smooth-
ing out the discontinuity in the probability of winning opens up the possibility
that an equilibrium returns to exist.
Each voter in generation I votes for candidate A if and only if candidate As
policy vector provides him with a greater utility than that provided by candidate
Bs policy vector. That is i votes for A if and only if:
V I(qA) +  + i;I > V I(qB) 8i (7)
where V I(~qj) represents the indirect utility function which generation I obtains
under the vector of policies chosen by candidate j.
2.4.2 The role of swing voters
In each generation there are some swing voters, represented by all of those
individuals who are indi¤erent between voting for candidate A or B. For these
voters the following condition holds:
I = V I(qBt )  V I(qAt )   (8)
Otherwise, all voters with i;I < I vote for candidate B and all voters with
i;I > I vote for candidate A.
Swing voters are pivotal, since even a little change in the policy vector may
force them to vote one candidate rather than another. Suppose to start from a
situation where As policy, qA, is exactly equal to Bs policy, qBt ; a candidate
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knows that, should it deviate from that policy, some swing voters would be
better o¤ (and vote for him) whilst some others would be worse o¤ (and vote
against him). Thus, in choosing a policy, a candidate should calculate the
number of swing voters which he gains and compare it with the number of swing
voters he looses; a change in policy should be made if and only if a candidate
evaluates that the number of swing voters gained outweighs the number of swing
voters lost.
I denote the expected share of votes for candidate A in generation I with:
A;I =
1
2
sI [I +
1
2sI
] =
1
2
sII +
1
4
(9)
and substituting (8) into (9) I obtain:
A;I =
1
2
sI [V I(qBt )  V I(qAt )  ] +
1
4
(10)
The total number of expected votes candidate A gets must sum the expected
number of votes of the two groups:
A =
1
2
st 1[V t 1(qBt )  V t 1(qAt )  ] +
1
2
st[V t(qBt )  V t(qAt )  ] +
1
2
(11)
Notice that A is a random variable since it depends on  which is also
random. Candidate As probability of winning is simply the probability to
obtain the simple majority of votes:
pA = Pr[A  1
2
] = Pr[
1
2
X
I
sI [V I(qBt )  V I(qAt )  ] +
1
2
 1
2
]
and rearranging terms we obtain:
pA = Pr[A  1
2
] = Pr[
X
I
sI [V I(qBt )  V I(qAt )]  
X
I
sI ]
Denoting 12
P
I
sI = s and 12s
P
I s
I [V I(qBt )  V I(qAt )] = b I obtain:
pA = Pr[A  1
2
] = Pr[b  ]
Finally, we also take into account the distribution of the other random vari-
able & to write a nal expression for the probability of winning:
pA = Pr[A  1
2
] = [b + 1
2
]
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Similarly, candidate B wins with probability pB = 1 pA.
Notice that pj may be written as the sum of probability of winning with
respect to single generations, weighted by the numerosity of the generation,
equal to 12 ; that is p
j = 12p
j
t +
1
2p
j
t 1, where p
j
I indicate the probability of
winning for candidate j for generation I.
Each candidate maximizes expected plurality ; that it a candidate wants either
to maximize the expected margin of victory or to minimize the expected margin
of loss, given the other candidates policy vector.
Dene
P`jI
 
qAt ; q
B
t

=
1
2
h
pjI
 
qAt ; q
B
t
  p jI  qAt ; qBt i (12)
the expected plurality for candidate j at a particular
 
qAt ; q
B
t

from a given
generation I and
P`j
 
qAt ; q
B
t

=
1
2
Xh
P`jI
 
qAt ; q
B
t
i
(13)
the expected plurality for candidate j.
We have now all the elements to dene a two-person, zero-sum game   where
the two candidates j = A;B are players, the two policy vectors qjt 2 Q  R2
the strategies and expected pluralities P`j
 
qAt ; q
B
t

: QQ  !R the payo¤s.
  is written as
 
Q;Q;P`A; P `B

.
Denition 5 A Pair
 
qAt ; q
B
t
 2 QQ is called a (pure strategy) Nash equi-
librium (NE) of   if and only if P`j
 
qAt ; q
B
t

6 P`j
 
qAt ; q
B
t

6 P`j
 
qAt ; q
B
t

,
8 qAt ; qBt 2 Q which satisfy the budget constraint.
It is also useful to remind that in a two-person, zero-sum game a pair of
policies
 
qAt ; q
B
t
 2 QQ is an equilibrium if and only if it is a saddle point
for the game
  =
 
Q;Q; P`A
 
qAt ; q
B
t

; P`A  qAt ; qBt 
2.5 Timing of the game
I consider a three-stage game where candidates aim to maximize the number of
votes 3 .
In the rst stage of the game, the two candidates, simultaneously and inde-
pendently, announce (and commit to) their policy vectors.
In the second stage elections take place. A candidate wins elections if and
only if obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a coin is tossed to
3Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the Nash
equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that obtained
when candidates maximize their probability of winning
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choose the winner. Furthermore, I assume that each party prefers to stay out
from the competition than to enter and lose, that prefers to tie than stay out
and it prefers to win than to tie.
Finally, in the third stage, workers choose their leisure, given the level of tax
credits chosen by the government.
2.6 Calculate the equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction, starting from the nal stage.
A representative old worker solves the following optimization problem:
max
l
U i;t 1t = c
t 1
t +  
t 1 log lt 1t +D
A  (i;t 1 + )
s:t: ct 1t = (1  
0t 1
t )(T   lt 1t )
Solving with respect to lt 1t I obtain an expression for the optimal amount of
leisure:
lt 1t =
 t 1
1   0t 1t
(14)
and substituting (14) into (1) I obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility
Function:
V t 1t = T (1 
0t 1
t )  t 1+ t 1 log t 1  t 1 log(1 
0t 1
t )+D
A (i;t 1+)
(15)
with 1    1  at 1t  > 0 =) at 1t > 1  1
I do the same for the representative young worker:
max U i;tt = c
t
t +  
t log ltt + (c
t
t+1 +  
t 1 log ltt+1) +D
A  (i;t + )
ctt = (1  
0t
t )(T   ltt)
ctt+1 = (1  
0t
t+1)(T   ltt+1)
ltt =
 
1   0tt+1
(16)
ltt+1 =
  1
1   0tt+1
(17)
V tt = T (1  
0t
t )   t +  t log t    t log(1  
0t
t ) (18)
+

T (1   0tt+1)   t 1 +  t 1 log t 1    t 1 log(1  
0t
t+1)

+DA  (i;t + )
12
Comparative statics shows that the optimal level of leisure is increasing in
preferences of groups for leisure and decreasing in the amount of tax credits.
That is dl
I
t
d I
= 1
1  0It
> 0 and dl
I
t
daIt
=  

 I
1  0It

< 0.
Analysing the indirect utility functions we may see that there are two e¤ects
coexisting together: a tax e¤ect, T (1  0It ), and a leisure e¤ect,   I log(1 
0I
t ).
What is the e¤ect of an increase in the optimal tax credit on the wealth of
an individual? At a rst glance, one would be prone to answer that an increase
in tax credits increases the individuals utility because the e¤ective marginal
tax rate reduces and the net-of-taxes labour income increases. But leisure e¤ect
says that an increase in tax credits reduces leisure, and eventually increases the
utility. Therefore, the total e¤ect on the welfare of an individual depends on
which e¤ect prevails.
In the second stage of the game
Proposition 6 the political equilibirum is a tie.
Proof. Candidates solve the following problem:
max
fat 1t ;attg
j
s:t: j = 0
j = A;B
The set of First Order Conditions may be written as follows:8>>><>>>:
A =
@A
@att
@
@att
A =
@A
@a
t 1
t
@
@a
t 1
t
(19)
8>>><>>>:
B =
@B
@att
@
@att
B =
@B
@a
t 1
t
@
@a
t 1
t
(20)
j = 0
where A; B are the two Lagrange multipliers which may be interpreted as
the per capita marginal gain in expected votes, with respect to a marginal shift
in transfers. In equilibrium A must be equal to B , because the per capita
marginal gain in expected votes should be equal for every candidate. Suppose
it is not; then, the expected number of votes of a party could be improved
without violation of the public budget constraint. As a consequence, it would
mean that there exists an incentive for a candidate to increase transfers towards
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those groups which promise a greater increase in the expected number of votes;
as long as this incentive exists such a situation cannot be an equilibrium.
Conditions (19), (20) state that candidates choose tax credits until the mar-
ginal political cost (MPC), which represents the reduction in expected votes, of
raising an additional dollar is equalized across cohorts. Hence, the politically
optimal structure is that one which minimizes total political costs and clear
the balanced budget constraint. The optimal solution is depicted in gure 3.
The shape of tax revenues reminds the famous "La¤er curve" or rate-revenue
relationships, shown in panels a and b. With respect to the traditional La¤er
curve, these ones have a negative tract; this is typical in a pure redistribution
model, because if one generation gets a positive transfer the other one must pay
it. Lambdas measure the intensity with which political tastes react to a change
in full income by reducing expected support. Di¤erent preferences for leisure
and di¤erent economic and political reactions to taxation solve in di¤erent tax
rates. Panel c shows the political equilibrium. The marginal political benet
(MPB) equates the sum of single MPBs expressed per dollar of expenditure.
The equilibrium is a point where Rt + Rt 1 = 0 and MPC = MPB < 0.
Lagrange multipliers are negative because @
j
@aIt
< 0 and @
j
@aIt
> 0. Instead, noth-
ing can be said about the shape of j , because second order conditions have an
indeterminate sign.4
Corollary 7 In equilibrium b = 0.
Proof. By proposition 6 the electoral equilibrium is a tie; then the probability
of winning must be equal to 12 for every candidate. Since we have dened p
j =
[b + 12 ], then b must be equal to zero.
In the rst stage candidates choose optimal policy vectors which are obtained
from the resolution of the maximization problem.
Proposition 8 A tie in elections may be achieved (i) either if policies converge
(ii) or if a policy chosen by one candidate favours one group and a policy chosen
by the other candidate favours the other group.
Proof. From Corollary 7 12
P
I s
I [V I(qBt )   V I(qAt )] is equal to zero. This
may be achieved only in two ways. Either (i) when policies are convergent,
qAt = q
B
t , which entails that V
I(qBt ) = V
I(qAt ); or (ii) when policies are
divergent, qAt 6= qBt , and in this case the following condition must hold:
1
2
st[V t(qBt )  V t(qAt )] +
1
2
st 1[V t 1(qBt )  V t 1(qAt )] = 0
which may be also written as:
1
2
st

V t(qBt )  V t(qAt )

=
1
2
st 1

V t 1(qAt )  V t 1(qBt )

4Second order conditions give @
2j
@aI2t
=
7z}|{
@Vt
@aIt
>0z}|{
s 1
<0z}|{
@sI
@aIt
>0z }| {
1 + sIs 1

+
>0z }| {
sIs 1
>0z }| {
@2Vt
@aI2t
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Notice that:
1. if an equilibrium is achieved via a policy convergence, then it must be true
that PrAt = Pr
A
t 1 = Pr
B
t = Pr
B
t 1 =
1
2 .
2. if an equilibrium is achieved via a policy divergence, one of the following
statements must hold: (i) either PrAt = 1, Pr
A
t 1 = 0, Pr
B
t = 0, Pr
B
t 1 = 1,
(ii) or PrAt = 0, Pr
A
t 1 = 1, Pr
B
t = 1, Pr
B
t 1 = 0.
Proposition 9 if qAt = q
B
t = qt then P`
j(qt; qt) = 0.
Proof. Notice that if qAt = q
B
t , V
t 1(qAt ) = V
t 1(qBt ) and V
t(qAt ) = V
t(qBt )
and thus the probability of winning for the two candidates for generations I is
equal to 12 . Therefore, P`
j (qt; qt) =
1
2

1
2   12

= 0.
The problem is now to evaluate whether the equilibrium of the model is
achieved via a convergence or a divergence of policies. I will provide a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition which assures that an equilibrium is achieved via
policy convergence. Instead, note that the classical Lindbeck and Weibulls
monotonicity condition to the policy convergence in probabilistic voting models
is not applicable. Appendix 1 demonstrates the non-applicability of monotonicy
condition.
Proposition 10 In a zero-sum game qAt = q
B
t = q

t .
Proof. First of all, we have dened   as a zero-sum game, since P`B
 
qAt ; q
B
t

=
 P`A  qAt ; qBt . Suppose now that the pair (qAt ; qBt ) 2 QQ is the electoral
equilibrium of the game. Suppose also that qAt 6= qBt . We know by (9) that
P`A
 
qBt ; q
B
t

= 0. Therefore, by the denition of Nash Equilibrium it must
be
P`A
 
qAt ; q
B
t

> P`A
 
qBt ; q
B
t

= 0 (21)
By denition of a zero-sum game we also know that P`B
 
qAt ; q
A
t

=
 P`A  qAt ; qAt  = 0 and again by denition of Nash Equilibrium, it must
be
P`B
 
qBt ; q
A
t

> P`B
 
qAt ; q
A
t

= 0 (22)
Since P`B
 
qBt ; q
A
t

=  P`A  qBt ; qAt , this implies that P`A  qBt ; qAt  <
0. By 21, this implies that P`A
 
qBt ; q
A
t

> P`A
 
qBt ; q
A
t

, a contraddiction.
Therefore, qBt = q
B
t .
Hence, in this model an equilibrium is achievable via a convergence of policies
but the Lindbeck & Weibull monotonicity condition cannot be applied. The NE
of the game is (qt ; q

t ; 0; 0).
Proposition 11 The optimal tax credits are a function of the density and nu-
merosity of both groups, of the nominal marginal tax rate, of the total endowment
of time and of preferences of groups for leisure. That is:
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aIjt = a

s

l

 I ; 

; s

l

  I ; 

 ; T;  I ;   I

Proof. see the Mathematical Appendix 2.
Thus, the political economy framework suggests that tax rates should be
di¤erentiated. Indeed, if the traditional normative approach suggests that a
benevolent governments should tax less the poorest social groups, this political
economy approach suggests that in a real world vote-seeker governments tax
groups according to their ability to threat politicians in an electoral competition.
A complete analytical solution to the maximization problem of the rst
stage is di¢ cult to nd because it is an hard task to understand which shape the
value function has. Nevertheless, since Q is a compact set, if the value function
is continuous in

aImint ; a
Imax
t

by the meaning of the Weierstrass theorem we
are sure that a maximum exist5 . Then it only remains to understand whether
the optimum is an interior solution or stands at the endpoints of the interval.
If the maximum is an interior solution, it must come out from the resolution of
the rst order conditions (see Appendix 2) which nds all the stationary points.
Proposition 12 If the maximimum is not an internal solution, then the NE is
either
 
atminAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

or
 
at 1minAt ; a
tmaxA
t ; a
t 1minB
t ; a
tmaxB
t

,
or both.
Proof. Note that in order to balance the budget constraint, if the marginal tax
rate for a generation is greater than one, the marginal tax rate for the other gen-
eration must be lower than one; otherwise the sum of the two tax revenues can
never be equal to zero. Since we know that aImin jt < 1 and a
Imax j
t > 1, solutions
such as
 
atminAt ; a
t 1minA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1minB
t

and
 
atmaxAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tmaxB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

are not achievable. Therefore we must conclude that the only possible solution
must be either
 
atminAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

or
 
at 1minAt ; a
tmaxA
t ; a
t 1minB
t ; a
tmaxB
t

,
or both.
This proposition has an important meaning. It says that, if an internal
solution is not achievable, candidates must favour a generation and penalize the
other generation as much as it is possible, choosing the highest and the lower
tax rates in the set of possible choices.
Conjecture 13 Tax credits are higher for the older generations.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Conjecture 14 The older generations o¤er either a very low level of labour
or retire at all, depending on the values which parameters assume, whilst the
younger generations o¤er a greater amount of labour.
5Weirstrass (or Extreme Value ) theorem states that a continuous function on a compact
set attains both a maximum and a minimum on the set. Note that the result gives only
a su¢ cient condition for a function to have a maximum. If a function is continuous and
is dened on a compact set then it denitely has a maximum and a minimum. The result
does not rule out the possibility that a function has a maximum and/or minimum if it is not
continuous or is not dened on a compact set
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Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Conjecture 15 Tax revenues collected via the labour taxation of the younger
generations are positive, whilst those of the older generations are negative.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Thus, a scal system where Leviathan governments take decisions helps older
generations to the early retire. As a consequence, revenues collected from the
taxation of the old are negative, whilst revenues collected with the taxation
of the younger generations are positive and equal to the amount of pensions
that the older receive. Thus, in this model there exists a net transfer from the
younger to the older generations, suggesting that the former carry the burden
of social security systems, whilst the latter gain a positive benet.
3 A variant with altruism
The simple model described above is able to explain the very negative phenom-
enon of early retirement. It depicts an economic environment where politicians
are captured by most single-minded groups. As long as candidates are self-
interested and only aim to win elections, this political failure a¤ects labour
markets outcome. Of course this cannot be optimal for society, especially con-
sidering the e¤ects on intergenerational equity: old generations are net receivers,
whilst young generations carry the entire burden of social security systems. Is
there any possibility to mitigate this persistent situation? As long as the old
are selsh and only aim to maximise their welfare a solution which increases
the youngs welfare is not achievable. Otherwise, I think that altruism may
represent a social solution to the early retirement. Alstruism is seen as a change
in preferences by the old which also pay attention to the youngs needs. I argue
that, if preferences are the real driver of political equilibrium, then a change in
preferences must necessarily lead to another equilibrium.
In this chapter I consider a model where the old workers care of their o¤-
springs wealth. A classical altruistic model considers that households can be
represented by a dinasty who is willing to perpetuate forever. As a consequence,
the old internalize the utility function of the young. The new utility function of
the old may be written as:
U t 1 = ct 1t +  
t 1 log lt 1t + U
t (23)
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter which captures the degree of altruism of the
old for the young; the higher  the more the old attach a greater importance to
the youngs wealth. Under this new framework, we should expect that policies
chosen by the government become less heavy for the young, since the old are
now prone to share the burden of social security systems.
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Conjecture 16 with respect to the basic model, tax credits for the old (young)
are lower (higher) and inter-generational transfers from the young to the old are
reduced.
4 Numerical Simulations
Numerical simulations were performed in order to assess the validity of con-
jectures 13-15, in the case where the maximum is an interior solution to the
maximization problem. They jointly state that the old generation, because
more single-minded, obtains more favourable policies by governments. That is,
the old obtain higher tax credits (conjecture 14) and positive inter-generational
transfers (conjecture 16). Furthermore, the combination of higher preferences
for leisure and higher tax credits entails the old to reach higher levels of leisure
(conjecture 15). As a consequence the young are the worse-o¤ generation, since
they get lower tax credits and have to pay the entire cost of social security
systems. Unfortunately, the real problem is that we cannot say if the value
function is concave, convex or neither concave nor convex, given the complexity
of the expression. As a consequence, we cannot be sure if stationary points we
found from rst order conditions are maximum.
To perform simulations a suitable density function is required. As suggested
by Profeta I will use one with a constant positive elasticity ", sI = (lI)", with
" = 1 for computational purposes. Table 1 shows results. The nominal marginal
tax rate,  , was set equal to 1 and the total endowment of time, T , equal to 0:9.
Simulations were performed using di¤erent values of preferences of workers for
leisure, always under the condition that the parameter of the old is higher the
that of the young. Tax credits are always higher for the old but the di¤erence
between tax credits of the two generations reduces with respect to a reduction
in the di¤erence between preferences. Leisure is always higher for the old and
the level of leisure increases both for the young and for the old from situation 1
to situation 9. Tax revenues are always positive for the generation of the young
and negative for the generation of the old, meaning that the young borne the
entire burden of social security systems; otherwise, the old get a transfer (i.e. a
pension). Notice that the inter-generational redistribution e¤ect is higher the
higher is the di¤erence between preference for leisure amongst cohorts. Finally,
notice that, even though the sum of preferences for leisure of the old and the
young is steadily equal to one, the total level of leisure is not constant. The
worst situation for the total employment level is reached in situation 9, whilst
the reverse is true for situation 1.
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 t 1  t  T at 1 at lt 1 lt l T t 1 T t
1 0:95 0:05 1 0:9 2:144 0:261 0:442 0:19 0:632  0:261 0:261
2 0:9 0:1 1 0:9 1:915 0:385 0:469 0:259 0:728  0:196 0:196
3 0:85 0:15 1 0:9 1:739 0:484 0:488 0:309 0:797  0:152 0:152
4 0:8 0:2 1 0:9 1:592 0:571 0:502 0:35 0:852  0:117 0:117
5 0:75 0:25 1 0:9 1:465 0:649 0:511 0:384 0:895  0:09 0:09
6 0:7 0:3 1 0:9 1:352 0:722 0:517 0:415 0:932  0:067 0:067
7 0:65 0:35 1 0:9 1:25 0:791 0:519 0:442 0:961  0:047 0:047
8 0:6 0:4 1 0:9 1:159 0:859 0:517 0:465 0:982  0:03 0:03
9 0:55 0:45 1 0:9 1:076 0:928 0:51 0:484 0:994  0:014 0:014
Table 1 - Numerical simulation (basic model)
Notice that the result which states the old get lower e¤ective marginal tax
rates are utterly new with previous results of probabilistic voting models applied
to social security systems. In Profeta, the old group is taxed heavier than the
young group (Proposition 3.1, p. 345); the same result is achieved also by
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (Proposition 8, p.31).
Table 2 shows results of simulations performed for the altruistic model in
order to assess the validity of conjecture 16. The altruistic parameter was set
equal to 0.3. With respect to previous results notice that in this case the old
(young) obtain lower (higher) tax credits and that there are less redistributive
e¤ects since transfers from the young to the old reduce. Furthermore, notice
that in situation 9 the young obtain a positive transfer, although this is rather
small. Leisure increases for the old, suggesting that the higher e¤ective marginal
tax rate increases the incentive to withdraw from the labour force, whilst leisure
of the young reduces. Total leisure reduces as well, but in situations 8, 9 where
this is slightly higher than the previous situation.
 t 1  t  T  at 1 at lt 1 lt l T t 1 T t
1 0:95 0:05 1 0:9 0:3 2:104 0:342 0:451 0:145 0:596  0:247 0:247
2 0:9 0:1 1 0:9 0:3 1:845 0:503 0:487 0:198 0:685  0:174 0:174
3 0:85 0:15 1 0:9 0:3 1:645 0:625 0:516 0:239 0:755  0:123 0:123
4 0:8 0:2 1 0:9 0:3 1:479 0:723 0:540 0:276 0:816  0:086 0:086
5 0:75 0:25 1 0:9 0:3 1:338 0:804 0:56 0:31 0:87  0:057 0:057
6 0:7 0:3 1 0:9 0:3 1:217 0:873 0:575 0:343 0:918  0:035 0:035
7 0:65 0:35 1 0:9 0:3 1:111 0:932 0:584 0:375 0:959  0:017 0:017
8 0:6 0:4 1 0:9 0:3 1:019 0:987 0:588 0:405 0:993  0:003 0:003
9 0:55 0:45 1 0:9 0:3 0:939 1:040 0:585 0:432 1:017 0:009  0:009
Table 2 - Numerical simulation (altruistic model)
5 Conclusions
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I introduced a very simple model where the generation of the old is more-single
minded than the generation of the young, that is it has greater preferences for
leisure. This enables this group to be more politically powerful in the political
competition amongst two candidates which have to choose the e¤ective marginal
tax rate on labour. The equilibrium of the game is such that the old obtain
more favourable policies; that is, higher tax credits, higher levels of leisure and
positive intergenerational transfers. Eventually, I conclude, the young are the
worse-o¤ generation, which has to borne the entire burden of social security
systems. Altruism may reduce this unfair redistribution scheme, lightening the
excess pressure on younger generations. Intergenerational pacts could represent
a possible solution to the early retirement problem, forcing the old generations
to internalize the welfare of the young generations in order to make them share
the entire burden of social security systems.
6 Mathematical Appendix
Proposition 17 (Monotonicity condition) Assume (i) V i is concave in qjt (ii) for each
group and candidate,
@j
@ai
@
@ai
is strictly monotonic. If (qAt ; q
B
t ) is a pure strategy electoral
equilibrium, then qAt = q
B
t .
Proof. From Proposition 6 we know that A and B must be equal for every generation.
This entails that the ratio between the two Lagrange multipliers of di¤erent candidates must be
equal for every generation as well. I call this ratio I = 
AI
BI
. The problem is to assess whether
this condition may be achieved under a divergence or a convergence of policies. To prove this,
I start assuming that qAt 6= qBt . Since candidates must clear the balanced-budget constraint,
there must exist a generation which gets higher tax credits under candidate A (suppose it is
t) and another generation which gets higher tax credits under candidate B (t  1). We have
to assess whether the condition t = t 1 is achievable in such a situation. If it is, then
an equilibrium is achieved under divergent policies; otherwise, policies are convergent. Notice
that if both the numerator and the denominator are monotonic, the ratio is monotonic. If so,
it means that (i) either t > 1 > t 1 or (ii) t 1 < 1 < t; therefore, an equilibrium
cannot be achieved via divergent policies.
In this model, and more in general in models where the direct utility function is quasi-linear
in the consumption and leisure, the monotonicity condition cannot be applied to solve the
candidates problem. The failure of the monotonicity condition may have several implications.
First of all, the possibility that the equilibrium is not achievable via a convergence of policies.
Secondly, and more important, the convexity of V means that a maximum does not exist,
since the value function is not concave.
(i) Convexity of V
Write the worker problem where the direct utility function is quasi-linear in consumption
and leisure
max
l
Ut = ct+ log lt subject to the budget constraint ct =  (1  at) (T   lt); lt >
0. The optimal leisure is lt =
 
1 (1 at) . Obtain the indirect utility function Vt =
20
T (1    (1  at))    + log

 
1 (1 at)

= T (1   t)    +  log    logw  
 log (1   (1  at)). Dene A = T   1 +  log substitute and obtain Vt = A  
 (1  at)T   log (1   (1  at)). Write the rst order condition
@V
@t = T    1 +at = 0
Note that there exist only a stationary point, aot = 1     T . Write the second order
condition and
@2V
@t2 =
 2
(1 +at)2 > 0
That is, V is a convex function and aot is a minimum.
(ii) Non-monotonicity
I impose the ratio I = 
AI
BI
equal to one, subtract the denominator from the numerator
and verify whether the expression has a clear sign. Denoting z = V I(qAt ) V I(qBt ) we get
the following:
Az }| { @
@aAtt
 
1
s

@
@aAtt
 
@
@aBtt
 
1
s

@
@aBtt
!X
I
1
2
stz +
Bz }| {
1
s
0@ @st@aAtt z
@
@aAtt
 
@st
@aBtt
z
@
@aBtt
+
st @V
t
@aAtt
@
@aAtt
 
st @V
t
@aBtt
@
@aAtt
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(24)
for t, and
 
Cz }| {0@ @@aAt 1t   1s
@
@aAt 1t
 
@
@aBt 1t
 
1
s

@
@aBt 1t
1AX
I
1
2
st 1z+
Dz }| {
1
s
0@ @st 1@aA t ( z)
@
@aAt 1t
 
@st 1
@aBt 1t
( z)
@
@aBt 1t
+
st 1 @V
t 1
@aAt 1t
@
@aAt 1t
 
st 1 @V
t 1
@aBt 1t
@
@aBt 1t
1A
(25)
for t  1. By the meaning of Proposition 6 A and C are equal to zero. Thus we have
only to verify that B and D are monotonic. Notice that by as demostrated before @V
t
@ajtt
is not
monotonic and that @
@ajtt
is not monotonic neither.
sign(z) changes according to the interval where tax credits nd. Denoting with aV=0+
and aV=0 points where the IUF intersects the axis
6 (respectively at the right and at the left
hand side) representing the tax credit we may easily see that 6 cases to study arise:
aB+< aA+< aV=0=) z < 0
aB+< aV=0< a
A+<ba=) z < 0
aV=0< a
B+< aA+<ba=) z > 0
aV=0< a
B+<ba< aA+< aV (aA)<V (aB)=) z > 0
6One may verify that indirect utility functions have two intersection points.
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aV=0+< a
B+<ba< aV (aA)<V (aB)< aA+< aV=0 =) z > 0
aV=0+< a
B+<ba< aV (aA)<V (aB)< aV=0 < aA+=) z > 0
We study the sign of expression (24) and (25). Since the sign (z) is discontinuous, @V
t
@ajtt
and @
@ajtt
are not monotonic, the sign of the expression is not clear and thus we cannot say a-
priori whether the monotonicity condition holds. As a consequence the Lindbeck & Weibulls
monotonicy condition may not be exploited in this model to demonstrate that an equilibrium
is only achievable via a convergence of policies.
7 Mathematical Appendix 2
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to candidates problem. The two candi-
dates face exactly the same optimization problem; they maximize their share of votes or,
equivalently, the probability of winning.
max
fat;at 1g
j =
1
2
+
1
2s
X
I
sI [V i(qjt )  V i(q jt )]
j  
2
X
I
(T   lIt )(1  aIjt ) = 0
I write the Lagrangian function:
L = 1
2
+
1
2s
X
I
sI [V i(qjt )  V i(q jt )]  
 
j

Deriving the Lagrangian I obtain rst order conditions which may be seen as a modied
version of the original Lindbeck and Weibulls rst order conditions:
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1) @L
@at 1jt
 12 @@at 1jt
 
1
s
P
I s
I [V i(~qj)  V i(~q j)] + 12s @s
t 1
@lt 1t
@lt 1t
@at 1jt
(V t 1j   V t 1 j)+
1
2ss
t 1( @V
t 1
@at 1jt
) = j @
j
@a 1jt
(2) @L
@atjt
 12 @@atjt
 
1
s
P
I s
I [V i(~qj)  V i(~q j)] + 12s @s
t
@ltjt
@ltt
@atjt
(V tj   V t j) + 12sst( @V
t
@atjt
) = j @
j
@atjt
(3) j = 0
By Proposition 10 we know that qAt = q
B
t , such that rst order conditions may be
simplied as:8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1) @L
@at 1At
 12sst 1( @V
t 1
@at 1At
) = A @
A
@at 1At
(2) @L
@atAt
 12sst( @V
t
@atAt
) = A @
A
@atAt
(3) A = 0
(4) @L
@at 1Bt
 12sst 1( @V
t 1
@at 1Bt
) = B @
B
@at 1Bt
(5) @L
@atBt
 12sst( @V
t
@atBt
) = B @
B
@atBt
(6) B = 0
(7) 
A
= B = 
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We then obtain the reaction functions:
rA =

atA = r
 
atB ; at 1B ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

at 1A = r
 
atB ; at 1B ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
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
;  ; T;  t 1;  t

rB =

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atA; at 1A; s
 
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 
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
; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

at 1B = r
 
atA; at 1A; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

Solving the system we obtain the optimal vector of policies from the set of intersection
points :
at 1At = a(s
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l
 
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
; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t)
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
; s
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l
 
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; s
 
l
 
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 ; T;  t 1;  t)
with at 1At = a
t 1B
t and a
tA
t = a
tB
t
with altruism the rst order conditions are modied as follows:8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1) @L
@at 1At
 12sst 1( @V
t 1
@at 1At
) = A @
A
@at 1At
(2) @L
@atAt
 12sst( @V
t
@atAt
) + 2ss
t 1( @V
t
@at 1At
) = A @
A
@atAt
(3) A = 0
(4) @L
@at 1Bt
 12sst 1( @V
t 1
@at 1Bt
) = B @
B
@at 1Bt
(5) @L
@atBt
 12sst( @V
t
@atBt
) + 2ss
t 1( @V
t
@at 1Bt
) = B @
B
@atBt
(6) B = 0
(7) 
A
= B = 
which gives a new set of intersection points :
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l
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l
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 
l
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 
l
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with at 1At = a
t 1B
t and a
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t = a
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FIGURE 1 
DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS WITH SINGLE-MINDED GENERATIONS 
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EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN GENERATIONS’ PREFEENCES ON DISTRIBUTION 
 
 
aI=1 
R
 
aI
R
a-I
aI*
a-I*
λ |R|
λ/MPB |R|R=0
R=0 
λ |R|a) 
b) 
c) 
FIGURE 3 
TAX STRUCTURE IN A POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 
 
